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Abstract: Fundamental legal-linguistic research includes next to monolingual 
approaches to the legal language also comparative approaches. Meanwhile, the 
epistemic value of comparative approaches is unclear in legal linguistics. 
Therefore, in this article different legal-linguistic comparative approaches will 
be scrutinized, and their perspectives made operational in legal linguistics. 
Especially, the traditional analysis of legal terminology gains momentum here 
in the context of discursive comparative approaches. The multilingual origins 
and the intertextual mode of existence and development of the legal language 
are identified as its characteristic features. They also shape processes in which 
the language of the global law emerges in the contemporary social reality. 
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ELEMENT KOMPARATYSTYCZNY W LEGILINGWISTYCE 
PORÓWNAWCZEJ 
 
Abstrakt: Legilingwistyczne badania podstawowe dotyczą tak źródeł 
monolingwalnych jak i analiz porównawczych. Wartość poznawcza podejść 
porównawczych do języka prawa pozostaje niewyjaśniona w legilingwistyce. 
Dlatego też w niniejszym artykule analizowane są różne podejścia 
porównawcze do języka prawa. Użyte są one do analiz tekstów prawnych 
w kontekście dyskursywnym i w tradycji komparatystycznej. Wielojęzyczne 
korzenie i multilingwalny tryb bytu są cechami charakterystycznymi tych 
tekstów. Podejścia porównawcze pomagają również zrozumieć procesy, 
w których język prawa globalnego kształtuje się w dzisiejszej rzeczywistości 
społecznej.  
 
Słowa klucze: legilingwistyka porównawcza; terminy i pojęcia prawne 
w tłumaczeniu; aspekty znaczenia i zrozumienia 
Introduction 
Legal linguistics is frequently construed as a monolingual scholarly 
enterprise (cf. Galdia 2017b). Valuable works on particular legal 
languages impress and structure the legal-linguistic research since its 
inception (cf. Tiersma 1999, Cornu 2005, Lizisowa 2016). Another, no 
less productive current is represented in legal linguistics by comparative 
undertakings. Until now, this dichotomy in the research was rarely 
problematized, especially in terms of legal-linguistic methodology. 
Meanwhile, fundamental legal-linguistic research includes next to 
issues of monolingual approaches to the legal language also the 
discussion of comparative approaches. The epistemic value of 
comparative approaches in legal linguistics remains unclear. Therefore, 
in the following, different legal-linguistic comparative approaches will 
be scrutinized and their perspectives made operational in legal 
linguistics. At this point, it is particularly important to ask how the 
method of comparative law could contribute or become integrated into 
the comparative legal-linguistic research. In such perspective, the 
traditional analysis of legal terminology may be repositioned in the 
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context of discursive comparative approaches. Its multilingual origins 
and intertextual existence are specific to its development. They also 
explain processes in which the language of the global law emerges in 
the contemporary social reality. 
Comparative legal-linguistic approaches 
For legal linguistics, the comparative study of law was essential to its 
development. All works on legal linguistics by one of its most 
renowned representatives, Professor Heikki E.S. Mattila, developed in 
a close relation to comparative law (cf. Mattila 2013, 2017). His 
comparative approach is distinct from the monolingual perspective 
adapted by other researchers, such as G. Cornu or P. Tiersma, who 
usually focused on the relation between the particular ordinary language 
and the legal language perceived as special register. Doubtless, 
comparative legal linguistics represents a strong current within legal-
linguistic studies that comes next only to monolingual legal-linguistic 
analyses. Legal-linguistic comparison may also concern one language, 
for instance the legal Latin and the way in which Latin terminology is 
reflected in other legal languages (cf. Mattila 2002: 181). To illustrate, 
the Spanish constitution (La Constitución Española de 1978) includes 
a Latin borrowing that is apt to be analyzed in such an approach: 
 
Art. 17 (4) La ley regulará un procedimiento de “habeas corpus” para 
producir la inmediata puesta a disposición judicial de toda persona 
detenida ilegalmente. Asimismo, por ley se determinará el plazo 
máximo de duración de la prisión provisional. (Transl.: A habeas corpus 
procedure shall be provided for by law in order to ensure the immediate 
handing over to the judicial authorities of any person illegally arrested. 
Likewise, the maximum period of provisional imprisonment shall be 
determined by law.) 
 
In this approach, the use of the Latin term habeas corpus may 
be analyzed also in its multilingual surroundings, for instance in English 
or German texts that include this borrowing. Consequently, quantitative 
as well as qualitative conclusions may be derived from such type of 
comparative legal-linguistic research. 
Another aspect of comparative legal linguistics is represented 
in the Poznań school of legilinguistics. Illustrative of the whole 
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approach is the project by P. Kozanecka, A. Matulewska, and 
P. Trzaskawka (2017: 14). Their project, which is rooted in the 
parametrical approach to legal translation, relies on connections to 
comparative linguistic and comparative legal studies (cf. also 
Matulewska 2017). In their project, the authors dealt with two main 
hypotheses: 1) the more distant two languages are in respect of their 
belonging to a legal family, the greater will be the risk of loss of 
information in translation, 2) the more distant are two legal systems in 
respect to their belonging to a legal family, the more problems will 
appear in translation with finding equivalent terms (cf. Kozanecka et al. 
2017: 15). Legal translatology may include further constellations 
discussed in the area of comparative law and thus expand the theory 
proposed to date. This concerns especially the constellation of bi- or 
multilingual legal systems that are expressed in genetically distant 
languages (cf. Dievoet 1987). Also G. R. de Groot (1987: 18, 25) 
stressed the specific case of translation in bi- or multilingual legal 
systems and underlined that the linguistic analysis also revealed that 
aspects important for comparative lawyers are not necessarily decisive 
from the perspective of translators as well as that the reception of law 
in many cases occurs in a different way than the development of 
languages themselves and that is why the global structure of legal 
systems in the world cannot be omitted in such a situation. Overall, 
comparative approaches to law may broaden the legal-linguistic 
perspective. However, while broadening the legal-linguistic perspective 
they may also methodically complicate the researched subject matter. 
This circumstance explains the necessity to research the methodical 
fundamentals of comparative legal linguistics. 
Next to comparative methods also contrastive approaches are 
used. Contrastive methods rise awareness rather than really compare. 
They appear frequently in the context of translation studies. For 
instance, the structure of the civil law and of the common law contract 
as far as the element of consideration is concerned differs and the 
contrastive analysis clarifies this moment. As the civil law system does 
not know consideration, the application of strictly comparative 
approaches in such a situation may end up with comparing the 
incomparable, yet it provides useful knowledge for legal translators. 
Comparative legal-linguistic approaches do not form any 
uniform perspective upon the legal language. Meanwhile, their 
common methodical denominator is the researchers’ commitment to the 
analysis of more than one legal language and the conviction that this 
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approach supplies added value to the legal-linguistic enterprise. Jurists 
cherished the same hope when approaching the legal diversity in the 
world in their comparative studies. 
Comparative study of law and its method 
While comparative and contrastive methods in contemporary 
linguistics are relatively clearly defined, comparative law, which 
influences comparative legal-linguistic studies, questions its methods 
regularly and persistently (cf. Husa 2018a, Pargendler 2012, Siems 
2016, Örücü 2004a and 2004b). The crisis of comparative law is deeply 
rooted in its conceptual frame of reference (cf. Husa 2018a: 411). In the 
recent debate, its main concepts such as legal family, legal tradition, 
and legal culture were scrutinized critically as much too superficial and 
inadaptable to the reality of the globalizing world. Under such 
circumstances, it is necessary to inquire whether legal comparison 
today is apt to uncover other than linguistically relevant features of law 
and to reach beyond comparative legal linguistics. And if this is the 
case, is the understanding of law by legal linguists not exhaustive? At 
this point, some legal-linguistic methodological assumptions could be 
formulated more precisely: First, as comparative legal linguistics 
cannot cope solely with the linguistic comparison of legal systems and 
especially with their terminology, one might ask what consequences the 
discussion in comparative law could have for the development of 
comparative legal-linguistic studies. The most relevant consequence 
seems to be the split in conceptual and terminological perspectives upon 
the language of law that results from the methodical understanding of 
legal comparatists. This is the more relevant as many researchers claim 
that legal translation is largely legal comparison. Second, the mentioned 
split allows also different levels of professional knowledge to emerge 
that finally enables legal translations by non-jurists. Therefore, legal 
and linguistic approaches to comparison in law are complementary, and 
not necessarily contradictory. They represent different modes of 
understanding law and display additional layers in the legal discourse. 
Meanwhile, the legal-linguistic perspective upon law enables the full 
understanding of the research object ‘law’. The above methodological 
assumptions will be clarified in the paragraphs that follow. 
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Comparative law or more precisely the comparative study of 
law (cf. Husa 2018a: 411) emerged probably due to differences that 
were identified between civil law and common law such as the 
contractual element of consideration that was mentioned above (cf. 
Stanzione 1973: 877). Other, more general goals such as understanding 
the phenomenon law more fully, especially beyond the limits of 
domestic legal systems and against the rigidity of the legal doctrine 
followed suit. One may also assume that for some jurists the 
attractiveness of the comparative study of law was rooted in its 
manifested liberty and openness to broader deliberation of legal 
problems that the traditional, positivist or neo-positivist legal doctrine 
viewed skeptically, if at all. However, this openness to new contents 
and liberty of thought proved also problematic in the sense of the 
comparative undertaking as an academic activity. A global vision of 
law was adapted in the comparative research that step by step comprised 
all laws that are applicable in the world. This moment in time marks 
also the emergence of the research into foreign law that is frequently 
confused with the comparative study of law and that in legal-linguistic 
studies could be qualified as contrastive rather than comparative.  
Thus, the question as to what the comparison of laws is, 
imposed itself as an inevitable prerequisite for whatever comparative 
study of laws. Traditionally, in the history of thought a tool for 
comparison was present in form of tertium comparationis, a criterion 
or benchmark to confront two or more related phenomena. It would 
suffice, as it seemed, to define precisely the tertium comparationis and 
the comparison of laws would follow more or less automatically. 
Meanwhile, this issue caused interminable debates in the comparative 
research and every step in the comparative activity was questioned, 
sometimes vehemently. Especially in the twentieth century the 
comparative method was exposed to criticism due to the emergence of 
the socialist law. Comparatists asked themselves whether traditional 
law, civil and common, can be compared with the socialist law that 
stressed its transitory nature and its otherness both in form and in 
content (cf. Stanzione 1973: 875, David 1978: 170, 215-216). Is 
contrasting both types of law actually comparison? Is meaningful 
comparison possible only between largely homogeneous laws such as 
civil and common law that in one way or another refer to their Roman 
roots? A problem-oriented approach was proposed as central to 
whatever scholarly reasoning to alleviate this methodological intricacy. 
This approach is definitely right, yet it is also very general, as whatever 
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intellectual activity can be labelled problem-oriented. Additionally, 
functional and systemic, casuistic versus dynamic approaches followed 
in comparative studies (cf. Stanzione 1973: 884). The available research 
into the fundamental question of comparison or comparability of laws 
enables jurists, in the view of many legal comparatists, to speak about 
the comparative study of law as an autonomous legal discipline, even if 
it to a large extent dealt with itself and much less with its object, 
especially when voluminous works on foreign law are deducted from 
the corpus of the comparative study of law.  
Within the traditional comparative paradigm, legal families 
were composed and legal traditions analyzed by comparatists. Later on, 
legal culture was proposed as one more concept to balance the deficits 
in the traditional comparison. The traditional way of comparison was 
embedded in the research paradigm that focused on the laws of the 
world that were neatly divided in legal families. This systematics 
allowed for exchanges in form of legal implants between different 
domestic laws, which were perceived as basically independent. It 
remains open what this research actually accomplished in terms of 
general knowledge about law, when the image of plurality in unity in 
the laws of the world is set apart. In fact, the traditional comparative 
study of law showed that notwithstanding many differences of form and 
content, the laws of the world in force today remain anchored in the 
conceptual framework of the Roman law, notwithstanding numerous 
updates to this conceptual base. Domestic laws emerged in this type of 
comparison as composed of legal substrates, superstrates, and adstrates 
like whatever language that is the result of contacts between groups of 
speakers. It also showed that laws evolve, but this dynamic feature they 
share with all other social phenomena, language most expressly 
included. This conclusion holds true even if some comparatists engaged 
in their research with the opposite goal in mind and alleged that 
fundamental structural differences would exist between the traditional 
dominant and the dominated legal systems of the world.  
While some universalist comparatists scrutinized legal 
morphology in order to identify the elementary particles of law, for 
instance offer and acceptance as elements of contract, they did not 
accomplish any legal grammar composed of such elements that would 
make clear the contemporary structure of law and enable its more 
systematic development worldwide. However, in its problem-oriented 
studies comparatists identified ways of interrelation of legal systems 
such as unification, approximation, harmonization, and coordination of 
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laws. Finally, the issue of globalization of law that has its intellectual 
origin in the comparatists’ idea of ius unum began to dominate the work 
of numerous comparatists (cf. Domingo 2010, Husa 2018b). This is an 
understandable concern as the total or partial disappearance of 
traditional laws of Asia and Africa, the approximation of civil law and 
common law that for some researchers comes close to their merger, the 
dismantlement of most socialist states as well as the subsequent 
disappearance of the divide into Eastern and Western jurists, and the 
presence of numerous elements borrowed from civil and common law 
in the Islamic law renders differentialist perspectives upon laws less 
attractive. Therefore, the impression emerged that macrocomparative 
approaches to laws do not offer any deeper insights as laws nowadays, 
for instance the Finnish and the Indonesian private laws, are much too 
close to each other to enable any substantial contrastive or comparative 
conclusions to be drawn from their comparison (cf. Mattila 2014). It 
remains, as always, the microcomparative approach that sometimes 
provides details that may be useful for governments when they prepare 
drafts of legislation. Such drafts are often based on foreign solutions to 
legal problems. 
In the newer discussion, the decomposition and recomposition 
of the conceptual frame of reference in form of a reload was proposed 
in order to reshape the comparative study of law in times of the ongoing, 
although sluggish, legal globalization (cf. Husa 2018a: 412). This is 
a procedure that proved its usefulness in critical times in any area of 
knowledge and it was advocated also in other disciplines (cf. Kaag 
2009). It is probable that in the main current of contemporary 
comparative studies the focus upon legal culture in times of legal 
globalization will reshape comparatists’ understanding of legal families 
and other traditional concepts. Jaakko Husa proposed to “accept 
commensurable overlapping conceptualizations” on the 
macrocomparative level (cf. Husa 2018a: 410). He also readjusted the 
concepts of legal family, legal tradition, and legal culture that he treated 
within a multivalent thinking where “everything is a matter of degree” 
and not of strict taxonomy (cf. Husa 2018a: 440). For instance, the 
domestic law of Hong Kong can be perceived as simultaneously 
belonging to the common law legal family, yet in terms of legal culture 
“it bears clear Asian legal cultural characteristics,” (cf. Husa 2018a: 
446). What is more, differentialist comparative perspectives will 
continue to play a role only in ideologically more pronounced research 
and the sociological and anthropological perspectives upon the 
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globalization of law will definitely gain momentum in the future. Yet, 
the biggest problem of the comparative study of law is its weak 
anchorage in methods of social sciences as many comparatists continue 
to cherish the idea of an autonomous, and apparently inherent rather 
than explicit comparative method, which they are ready to enrich with 
conceptual puzzles from other social sciences that are borrowed rather 
inconsistently. It seems that the crisis will not be overcome without 
a step toward full integration of the study of law into social sciences. 
This step would facilitate the use of methods and results reached in the 
comparative study of law also in legal linguistics. Finally, from the 
legal-linguistic perspective it can be maintained that the impact of legal 
comparison would further increase through the shift of attention to 
comparing legal-linguistic operations. It could be used primarily in 
order to elucidate the question whether legal-linguistic operations such 
as legal interpretation or legal argumentation are actually ubiquitous 
(cf. Galdia 2017a: 201). Such undertaking could be carried out under 
a common, integrative legal-linguistic comparative label.  
Identifying the comparative element in comparative 
legal linguistics 
Thus, comparative legal-linguistic approaches share the fate of the 
comparison in law, where comparison is the domain of comparative 
law. They also depend on linguistics proper, where comparative 
linguistics can be perceived as a special area or a method. 
Methodologically, comparison definitely requires a tertium 
comparationis, i.e. a set of categories or parameters that form the 
background of the comparative activity. From the perspective of 
general linguistics, comparative efforts may appear circular as they 
finally prove that the scrutiny of linguistic diversity, which is their point 
of departure, uncovers general linguistic patterns, which the diversity 
of languages masks for an unprepared observer. Yet, for many linguists 
such a result is rather obvious. In linguistics, comparative methods 
gained momentum also in relation to translation, as the conventional 
character of language becomes better visible in comparison. In 
comparative law, the result is no different. There, the multitude of legal 
systems can be combined into several groups and these, finally, can 
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form a system of fundamental legal elements that constitute the law as 
an abstract structure or model, and not the multitude of legal systems. 
As mentioned, comparative efforts in linguistics help uncover 
universal structures. It goes without saying that the same structures 
could have been uncovered also in the monolingual research, yet most 
linguists have their pains with such a procedure. Some of such universal 
structures are rather elementary. 
We may distinguish terminological or textual parallelism and 
comparison, for instance in related provisions of the Polish and the 
German penal codes: 
The Polish Criminal code (Kodeks karny) says:  
 
Art. 148. § 1. Kto zabija człowieka, podlega karze pozbawienia 
wolności na czas nie krótszy od lat 8, karze 25 lat pozbawienia wolności 
albo karze dożywotniego pozbawienia wolności. (emphasis added), 
 
while the German penal code (Strafgesetzbuch) stipulates: 
§ 212 Totschlag. (1) Wer einen Menschen tötet, ohne Mörder zu sein, 
wird als Totschläger mit Freiheitsstrafe nicht unter fünf Jahren bestraft. 
(2) In besonders schweren Fällen ist auf lebenslange Freiheitsstrafe zu 
erkennen. (emphasis edded). 
As far as the emphasized parts of the two provisions are 
concerned their comparison shows that they are literally identical. This 
linguistic or textual parallelism has reasons that are rooted in the 
drafting tradition of legal texts, i.e. in their intertextual mode of 
existence. Identifying such parallelisms is a by-product of the 
comparative approach. Legal intertextuality facilitates the emergence 
of the language of the global law and it is also evidence for the ongoing 
process of the globalization of legal language. As we deal with 
a universal elementary structure, its propositional content can be 
neglected at this point.  
Terminological or textual parallelism is frequent in statutory 
texts:  
Art. 1156 French Code civil saying: 
 
On doit dans les conventions rechercher quelle a été la commune 
intention des parties contractantes, plutôt que de s’arrêter au sens 
littéral des termes, 
 
and Art. 1362 Italian Codice civile:  
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Nell’interpretare il contratto si deve indagare quale sia stata la comuna 
intenzione delle parti e non limitarsi al senso letterale delle parole,  
 
are that close as to their content and linguistic form that one may assume 
that the one is the translation of the other.  
Furthermore, the formulation of the Art. 1161 French Code 
civil (in force until 2016):  
 
Toutes les clauses des conventions s’interprètent les unes par les 
autres, en donnant à chacune le sens qui résulte de l’act entier, 
 
corresponds literally to Art. 1363 Italian Codice civile:  
 
Le clausole del contratto si interpretano le une per mezzo delle altre, 
attribuendo a ciascuna il senso che risulta dal complesso dell’atto 
(emphasis added).  
 
As this resemblance cannot be coincidental because it even 
comprises legal phraseologisms, it can be posited that they stand to each 
other in a relation of intertextuality, i.e. that the one has been developed 
because the other existed already. As the French Civil code dates from 
1804 and the Italian Codice civile entered into force only 1942 one can 
claim that the Italian provision is the translation of the French. 
Basic legal comparison in legal-linguistic perspective 
From the legal-linguistic perspective the art of comparison practiced by 
legal comparatists is concept-oriented. Linguists, in turn, often start 
their comparative work with terms. This finding concerns also legal 
translators who mainly focus upon legal terms and only rarely upon 
legal concepts. Traditional legal comparison may look as follows: 
A jurist interested in comparative law may research eligibility 
conditions for the offices of the U.S. President and for the President of 
Latvia. First, she will determine the relevant provisions in the legal acts 
of both countries. These will be Art. II of the U.S. Constitution and 
Art. 3 of the Latvian Constitution (Satversme). The mentioned 
constitutional provisions say:  
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No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United 
States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible 
to the Office of the President; neither shall any Person be eligible to that 
Office who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty five Years, and 
been fourteen Years a Resident within the United States. (U.S. 
Constitution, Art. II, Sec.1),  
 
and,  
 
Par Valsts Prezidentu var ievēlēt pilntiesīgu Latvijas pilsoni, kurš 
sasniedzis četrdesmit gadu vecumu. Par Valsts Prezidentu nevar ievēlēt 
pilsoni ar dubultpilsonību. (LR Satversme III/37) (Trans. A major 
citizen of Latvia who has accomplished forty years of age can be elected 
President of the State. A citizen with double citizenship cannot be 
elected President of the State.)  
 
Second, the comparative lawyer will find out that the 
comparison of elements relevant to eligibility in the above provisions 
shows differences in the age limit, residency, naturalization, and double 
citizenship. Based on these textual elements, the legal comparatist can 
develop an argument concerning the eligibility conditions in both 
constitutions. The legal linguist would be additionally interested in the 
way the U.S. and the Latvian legislators state the eligibility conditions 
and in the legal argumentation in texts that apply these provisions. Full 
understanding of law comprises both the functional-comparative and 
the legal-linguistic analysis. 
Meanwhile, the above comparative approach is formal, if not 
formalistic as the role of the President in the U.S. and in the Latvian 
constitutional law is different. What remains is the commonality of 
terms as president equals presidents in Latvian. Not much knowledge 
follows from this sort of comparison of the incomparable.  
The more the compared texts differ structurally, the more difficult 
is the comparative inquire. Even a relatively small modification in the 
structure of a legal text may methodically complicate its comparison 
with other texts. For instance, Art. 127 (I – III) of the Polish 
Constitution establish a broader textual framework:  
 
(1) Prezydent jest wybierany przez Naród w wyborach 
powszechnych, równych, bezpośrednich i w głosowaniu tajnym. (2) 
Prezydent Rzeczypospolitej jest wybierany na pięcioletnią kadencję 
i może być ponownie wybrany tylko raz. (3) Na Prezydenta 
Rzeczypospolitej może być wybrany obywatel polski, który 
najpóźniej w dniu wyborów kończy 35 lat i korzysta z pełni praw 
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wyborczych do Sejmu. Kandydata zgłasza co najmniej 100 000 
obywateli mających prawo wybierania do Sejmu. (Transl. (1) The 
President of the Republic shall be elected by the Nation, in 
universal, equal and direct elections, conducted by secret ballot. (2) 
The President of the Republic shall be elected for a 5-year term of 
office and may be re-elected only for one more term. (3) Only a 
Polish citizen who, no later than the day of the elections, has attained 
35 years of age and has a full electoral franchise in elections to the 
Sejm, may be elected President of the Republic. Any such 
candidature shall be supported by the signatures of at least 100,000 
citizens having the right to vote in elections to the Sejm.) 
 
The complete text of Art. 127 comprises seven paragraphs. It 
makes clear that the Polish provision structures the issue of eligibility 
of the president differently. Therefore, it would necessitate a more 
nuanced methodology to be explored within our context of comparison 
of the above U.S. and Latvian provisions. It is understood that basic 
legal comparison does not cover all comparative intricacies of law, yet 
it allows the first insight into the way the legal comparatists work. This 
enables a better understanding of the legal-linguistic activities, 
especially in terms of the theory of legal translation. 
Concepts and terms in legal linguistics  
The previous paragraphs seem to indicate that the comparison of legal 
and legal-linguistic approaches to law also contributes to our 
understanding of the topics related to the difference between legal terms 
and legal concepts. Indeed, one of the most fundamental questions in 
the legal-linguistic research is the elucidation of the relation between 
concepts and terms in the legal language (cf. Galdia 1999, Mattila 
2018). The linguistically marked difference between concept and term 
requires a thorough scrutiny from the legal-linguistic perspective. In 
daily experience, we can imagine a dog without expressing the term 
dog. We can also imagine some abstract concepts such as triangle, yet 
not prototypically, i.e. exclusively within its mathematical definition. 
Meanwhile, already more complex concepts such as liberty cause 
problems in this respect. Doubtless, however, we cannot imagine the 
promissory estoppel without using its linguistic expression in one way 
or another. Basically, in the area of law there is no legal concept without 
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a corresponding legal term. Apparently, it would be impossible to think 
about a legal concept were a term not at the speaker’s disposal. The 
linguistic expression of a concept is the term, which means that both are 
united like two sides of the same coin. One could therefore ask why 
legal theory still operates with the split of one thing in two. The reason 
may be practical, as shown on the example of the coin. Adverse 
possession in the American law and Ersitzung in the German law refer 
to the same concept, yet express it with different linguistic means. 
Certain linguists and comparative lawyers perceive this superficial 
difference of term formation as substantial. They will say that two terms 
correspond with one concept. The divide between concept and term is 
used to mark this difference. From the pragmalinguistic perspective, the 
content of the terms is the same, no split in term and concept is 
necessary.  
In the context of this problem, G. R. de Groot (1987: 20) dealt 
with the problematic equivalence between the Dutch moord (murder) 
and doodslag (homicide) as well as the German Mord (murder) and 
Totschlag (homicide). He says significantly that Mord is defined in Art. 
211 of the German criminal code. Meanwhile, the code mentions the 
murder only in the headline of Art. 211 and actually regulates the 
question who is a murderer (cf. Mörder ist, wer aus Mordlust…,i.e. 
Murderer is who out of desire to murder…) and it in its wording does 
not characterize explicitly the act of murder. De Groot’s challenging 
remark is significant because it enables to grasp the difference between 
concept and term in the legal language. Jurists think in concepts, 
linguists identify terms. Therefore, the jurist perceives the murder in 
the provision that deals explicitly with the murderer. This perception is 
not irrational, and it is also justified by syntax and semantics of the 
provision in question. In fact, the linguistic transformation of the 
provision in the sense of de Groot’s perception is easy: (1) Mörder ist, 
wer aus Mordlust…can be transformed into (2) Einen Mord begeht, wer 
aus Mordlust…as this content is inherent in the language of the original. 
Hence, the provision, while explicitly referring to the murderer 
regulates the murder. Linguists understand the possibility of such 
transformations, yet for them language starts with terms, not with 
concepts, as terms are uncontroversially present in the language. Jurists 
accept in their work on legal texts the approximate approach to 
language and proceed intuitively. This approach is justified by the fact 
that they are native speakers of the language in question. Yet, complex 
legal questions that involve semantic intricacies cannot be solved with 
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the intuition of a native speaker. In our case of the murderer the 
prerequisite of the murder that he might have committed is a.o. the 
action aus Mordlust (i.e. out of desire to murder) that necessitates 
a legal-linguistic analysis in cases where it might be applicable. For 
such questions, jurists set up a methodology including, for instance, 
interpretation canons (cf. Galdia 2014). These canons have, however, 
proven deficient in theory and in practice. It is the task of legal 
linguistics to describe and to set up a method of legal interpretation that 
would replace jurists tentative and occasionally even fitting statements 
about the meaning of laws. This is necessary because modern law 
requires court decisions that are rationally justified and fulfill the 
requirement of certainty of law. Attempts to grasp meaning intuitively 
will not satisfy these requirements. 
Legal-linguistic understanding and comparative legal 
linguistics 
The above discussion of the split in the perspectives to legal language 
that depend on the term-centered or on the concept-centered approaches 
clarifies the problem of understanding of legal texts in comparative 
legal linguistics. As a matter of fact, translatorial understanding of texts 
and their underlying subject matters is rarely exhaustive. Heuristic 
barriers and economic constraints of the exercise of a practical 
profession impose restrictions upon translators’ inquisitive approaches 
to texts. These problems manifest themselves in translations in several 
ways. I limit myself to two types of problems that appear to me 
essential. The first is purely textual, the second uncovers methodical 
presuppositions of legal-linguistic understanding of legal texts. 
Understanding is a multifaceted concept as there are several 
ways to understand a subject matter. For instance, a medical doctor 
understands medicine that he studied during many years in a specific 
way, a nurse also understands medicine, yet differently. Both represent 
the understanding of a subject matter that is typical of their profession. 
Neither of them is exhaustive and neither can fully replace the other. 
Also, levels of understanding may differ. To understand may mean to 
be able to use the remote control of a TV set, yet also the knowledge of 
equations that state physical fundamentals of the steering process 
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behind the remote control. Levels of knowledge are different, yet 
different levels of knowledge are necessary to exercise a profession. 
The split between concept and term corresponds also to different sorts 
of knowledge that is involved in applying concepts and terms. There is 
a difference between my knowledge of IT technology that is limited to 
simple know how (for instance how to use basic functions of the Word 
program) and an IT specialist’s knowledge, who is able to write the 
Word program code. Terms appear in this context as the use of a ready 
program, but concepts require programming skills. The first type of 
knowledge enables the translator to survive professionally, the second 
makes of her a professional translator. 
In the area of legal linguistics, the understanding what 
promissory estoppel means in the common law does not equal the 
knowledge how to translate it into Polish. The translator needs, next to 
the knowledge of the concept also the explanation of the term and its 
equivalent term in the target language. Yet, full understanding of law is 
acquired only in the legal-linguistic perspective. The example below 
may illustrate this full understanding of the legal language. The Finnish 
law about the public access to trials (Laki oikeuskäynnin julkisuudesta, 
21.12. 1984/945) provides in its Art. 5:  
 
Tuomioistuin voi asianosaisen vaatimuksesta tai erityisestä syystä 
muutenkin päättää, että suullinen käsittely toimitetaan kokonaan tai 
osaksi yleisön läsnä olematta,…3) kun alle 18-vuotias henkilö on 
syytteessä rikoksesta. 
 
The translation into German of Art. 5 is risky, yet possible because of 
the same conceptual background of both provisions that are rooted in 
the same tradition of penal law. Due to conceptual differences between 
Finnish/German and English penal laws and their languages, the 
translation into English would be possible only with a detailed 
commentary. The translation into German, which is easier may read as 
follows: 
 
Das Gericht kann auf Antrag des Beteiligten oder beim Vorliegen 
besonderer Gründe beschießen, dass die mündliche Verhandlung 
teilweise oder gänzlich unter Ausschluss der Öffentlichkeit stattfindet, 
wenn…3) eine Person unter 18 Jahren wegen einer Straftat angeklagt 
wird. (emphasis added) 
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The regimen of Finnish syyttää and German anklagen differs. 
The authoritative dictionary of the Finnish language clarifies the 
Finnish regimen: “Nostaa jtkt syyte, vaatia jklle rangaistusta jstak. 
Syyttää jkta murhasta, lahjonnan ottamisesta. Joutui oikeuteen 
kavalluksesta syytettynä” (cf. Grönros et al. 2012, vol. 3, p. 209). As in 
the source text, the object appears as accused of a crime, its complete 
translation into German seems unavoidable, although wird angeklagt/is 
accused would be correct in German as in English. Meanwhile, the 
Finnish criminal law abandoned the differentiation of crimes that were 
previously divided in rikomus and rikos, like the German penal law that 
still knows Verbrechen and Vergehen (cf. also crimes and 
misdemeanors in the common law), As a translatorial compromise, 
rikos can be translated here by the general German term Straftat. 
However, this compromise causes problems in the application of the 
provision as the question could come up as to the necessity to 
differentiate in degree of the crime committed in the application of the 
provision. Terms are unproblematic in this case, yet their translation 
requires a conceptual analysis. This analysis is anchored in comparative 
criminal law. 
Finally, the comparative legal-linguistic approach is the 
methodological requirement of insights such as those presented above. 
It presents legal terms in their broader conceptual settings and takes into 
consideration the discursive prerequisites of meaning emergence in 
legal texts. 
Conclusions 
Comparative legal linguistics and comparative law are closely related 
areas of knowledge that differ in their methods and research interests. 
A closer scrutiny of their methodological fundamentals would allow for 
better integration of their approaches and results. Especially, the 
approach to the legal language that in comparative law is centred on 
legal concepts and in comparative legal linguistics is dominated by 
terminological analysis constitutes a challenge for legal linguists. Yet, 
this split in interests and perspectives may also facilitate our 
understanding of the way how certain legal linguists, mainly translators 
of legal texts, understand the underlying subject matter of their 
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translations. It may also explain the legal-linguistic understanding of 
legal texts. The above analyses of elementary comparative 
constellations display structural problems that can be identified and 
solved only with the help of legal-linguistic methods. Last but not least, 
the above analyses illustrate processes in which the language of the 
emerging global law comes about and the discursive anchorage of legal 
terminology that is rooted in legal intertextuality. 
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